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Tax Reform and Investment:
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Steven 41. Fazzari
HE U.S. Congress has recently passed historic
legislation that revises the fundamental structure of
U.S.income tax law. Promoters ofthis legislation hope
that the new tax system will encourage more produc-
tive use of economic resources and faster economic
growth. Economists disagree very littleabout the gen-
eral objectives of tax refor-m. The new law, however,
has drawn significant criticism, primarily because of
itstreatment of capital investment. The new law weak-
ens or eliminates many tax initiatives originally de-
signed to stimulate investment.
This article analyzes the effect of tax reform on
investment and the U.S. capital stock. It discusses the
channels through which changes in the corporate
income tax rate, the investment tax credit and the
rules fordeducting depreciation expense from taxable
income affect the cost of capital and a firm’s invest-
ment decisions. Furtherrnor-e, this article assesses
how the increase in corporate taxes affects invest-
ment. First, however, the next section presents some
capital theory concepts that provide a framework for
understanding tax effects on investment.
SOME BASIC CONCEPTS IN
CAPITAL THEORY
A firm invests to maintain and expand its stock of
productive capital. Most economic models of invest-
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ment beginwith the equation:
[Changein 1 - -
(II Investment = I . . I + Depreciation.
j,Desrred CapitalJ
Over the long run, the amount of depreciation is
determined primarily bythe size ofthe capital stockin
place. To explain investment, therefore, one must un-
derstand how firms choose their desired stock of
capital.’
We begin by analyzing the investment decisions ofa
representative firm that maximizes its expected earn-
ings over-time to increase the wealth of its sharehold-
ers. The firm faces constraints on its choices. Some of
these constraints, like the firm’s technology, are deter-
mined by past investment decisions and the long-
term development of the economy; other constraints
are market-determined, such as interest rates and the
availability of funds to finance investment spending.
The tax system imposes another constraint on the
firm’s behavior. To under-stand its role in investment
decisions, we must first see how firms would make
investment decisions in the absence of corporate
taxation.
‘Equation 1 explains gross investment. Some studies consider the
change in desired capital alone, ornet investment. The response of
investment and the actual capital stock to changes in the desired
capital stockwill not be immediate; there may be long lags between
investmentdecisions, orders, expenditures and delivery. Estimates
of these lags are necessary to predict the timing of investment
arising from a change in desired capital. These transitional issues
are beyond the scope of this article. The analysis here focuses on
the long-runchanges in the capital stock caused by the new taxlaw.
For further discussion of short-run adjustments, see Jorgenson’s
(1971) survey article.
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Investment Decisions without
Corporate Taxation
When considering capital expenditure, a firm will
compare the revenue that the new investment will
produce overits useful life with the costs of purchas-
ing and using the new capital. Because capital goods
are durable, they contribute to production over a
number ofyears. It would be incorrect, therefore, to
charge thefull purchase price ofacapital good against
revenue in the year it is purchased. Rather, the cost of
acapital asset over a year-isits opportunity cost; this is
simply what the firm gives up by holding it for ayear.
In the absence oftax effects, theopportunity cost ofan
investment has two components: interest expense
and depreciation.2
Suppose a firm uses its own funds to finance an
investment expenditure. The firm gives up the oppor-
tunity to earn interest on these funds. If the firm
borrows from others to finance its investment, then it
must payinterest to its creditor. Whether thefirm uses
its own funds orborrows from others, some measure
ofinterest expense enters the cost of capital.
Actually, only the realinterest rate affects thefirm’s
cost ofcapital. Assume that capital goods prices rise at
the same rate as thegeneral price level. Ifthe interest
rate were equal to the inflation rate, thefirmwould not
sacrifice any purchasing power by holding capital
assets instead of financial assets. Only the portion of
interest that exceeds what is necessary to offset ex-
pected inflation, real interest, represents asacrifice for
firms that hold capital rather than financial assets. Let
i denote the nominal interest rate and iv’ denote the
expected inflation rate - Then the real expected inter-
est i-ate can be closely approximated by i —
These concepts lead to a natural characterization of
the way firms determine their desired capital stock
and their corresponding investment decisions. New
investment increases a firm’s output. Economists call
this increment to output during a year’ the marginal
product of capital (MPK). The revenue gained from
‘Rather than analyzing the cost of holding a capital asset year by
year, wecould computethe presentvalue ofthe costs overthe lifeof
the asset. This would be subtracted from the present value of the
revenues generated by the assetto give the net present value. To
maximize its shareholders wealth, the firm would invest in any
project with a positive net present value. This procedure is more
complicated than the year-by-year analysis presented in the text. It
leads to equivalent results, however, assuming that the firm takes
therateof depreciation andthereal rate ofinterest asconstant over
the lifeof theasset.
investing in another unit of capital, the value of the
marginal product of capital, is P x MPK, where p
represents the firm’s output price. The opportunity
cost ofaunit of capital, is its price, PC, multiplied by the
sum ofthe real interest rate and the depreciation rate
— ~e + d).The insert on theopposite page provides
an example calculation of this cost.
If the value of the marginal product of capital,
P X MPK,exceeds the opportunity cost ofinvestment,
P,(i it-’ + d), the firm can increase its profit by
making theinvestment. On the other hand, ifP>< MPK
is less than P0(i — ‘ir’ + dl, the investment is not
profitable. To maximize its profits, the firm will invest
up to the point at which the revenues and costs from
additional capital are equal, or,
(2) P)< MPK = P,ti — ‘it’ + di.
The firm’s desired capital stockis reached when the
last unit ofcapital purchased satisfies equation 2.This
is afundamental result in capital theory-It divides the
determinants of a firm’s desired capital stock into
technical (MPK and dl and market factors (P, P,. i).
Changes in these factors alter afirm’s desired capital
stock, and, as equation I shows, changes in the de-
sired capital stock along with depreciation determine
investment.2
TAX REFORM AND THE COST
OF CAPITAL
Of course, equation 2i sstrictly valid only in the
absence ofcorporate taxation. But the analysis under-
lying it helps to explain how the new tax lawwill affect
capital spending. The changes necessary to incorpo-
rate corporate taxation into equation 2 are summa-
rized in the insert on page 18. The key issue consid-
ered here is how tax reform has changed the after-tax
cost of capital. We shall analyze three changes of
particular importance: the repeal of the investment
tax credit, the change in depreciation rules and the
cut in the corporate taxrate.
Repeal ofInvestment Tax Credits
In 1963, theEconomicReport ofthe President stated
that “. --it is essential to our employment and growth
2ln general, the marginal product ofcapital in equation 2 will depend
on the input of other factors of production along with the capital
input. These other factors, labor in particular, are not considered
here. Forfurther discussion of this issue, see the Economic Report
ofthe President(1987), pp. 90—93.
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objectives as well as to our international competitive
stance that we stimulate more rapid expansion and
modernization of America’s productive facilities.”~
One policy designed to achieve this goal was the
investment tax credit, first instituted in 1962. This tax
subsidy allowed firms to reduce their taxes by a per-
centage of their spending on certain kinds of capital
equipment.
To integrate this into the capital theory summarized
by equation 2, suppose that the revenues from capital
investment are taxed at a rate t and theonly allowable
deduction forcapital costs isthe investment tax credit
at a rate of k. Then, the after-tax cost of purchasing a
unit of capital is the price paid (P,) minus the invest-
ment tax credit amount (I<PC). The after-tax benefit of
investment is (1 — U multiplied by the value of the
marginal product of capital. This changes equation 2
to
131 P. x MPK (I—ti IP,—kP,) li—iv’+d(
= P,(1—k)(i—’rr’+di.
The investment tax credit reduces the after-tax cost of
capital on the right-hand side ofequation 3, increasing
the desired capital stock and investment. The new tax
bill, by eliminating this subsidy, directly increases a
firm’s cost of capital, reduces the corporate sector’s
desired capital stock and depresses investment.
4See pages xvi—xvii of thereport.
Depreciation Rules: Some Theory
As capital wears out over time, its value declines,
imposing a cost on the firm that should be deducted
from its taxable income. A problem arises, however,
when this concept is put into practice: how should
depreciation costs be determined for tax purposes?
From an economic perspective, depreciation is the
change in the market value of a capital asset. But
market value would becostly for firms to measure and
the IRS to verity. As an alternative, the tax code pro-
rides schedules prescribing the percentage of an as-
set’s purchase price that can be deducted from each
year’s taxable income. Changes in these rules lead to
changes in the after-tax cost of capital faced by firms.
While all depreciation schedules allow deductions
that eventually equal the total historical cost of an
asset, the earlier these deductions occur, the more
valuable they are. Thus, the after-tax cost of capital is
reduced by depreciation schedules that concentrate
deductions over ashorter’ period. Also, “accelerated”
depreciation, which permits firms to write offa greater
proportion of the asset’s cost early in its life, reduces
the cost of capital relative to “straight line” methods
that divide the deductions evenly over the asset’s
service life.’ To evaluate the importance of changing
‘See Ott (1984) for a discussion of depreciation methods and an
analysis of the effects of changes in the depreciation rules that
occurred in 1981 and 1982.
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depreciation deductions, thus partly offsetting the
negative impact of extending service lives.
Finally, by reducing the corporate tax rate, the new
taxlaw increases the after-tax discount rate firms use
to calculate the piesent value of their- depreciation
deductions at agiven nominal interest rate. By itselt
this reduces the present value ofaparticular- sequence
of depreciation deductions.
As table I shows, on net these changes cause the
present value of depreciation allowances to decline
under- the new tax law. ‘I’he effects for equipment are
modest on average.
The new lawhas amuch more significant impact on
business structures. The ACRS system adopted in 1981
allowed firms to depreciate business structures over
19 years with an accelerated method (175 percent
declining balance). The new law requires straight line
depreciation over 31.5 years. As the bottom row of
table I shows, this significantly reduces the pr-esent
value of depreciation allowances for structures.
Changes in the Corporate Tax Rate
The new tax law cuts the top corpot-ate income tax
rate from 46 percent to 34 percent. By itself, it might
seem that this would stimtrlate investment, because it
allows flims to keep a larger proportion of the profits
earned from new capital. ‘I’he analysis that led to
equations 2 thiough 4 shows that this may not be the
case. Although a cut in the corporate income tax rate
increases the after-tax revenues gained from new in-
vestment, it also decreases thevalue oftax deductions
generated by capital costs. Thus, the net effect on
investment ofalower corporate tax rate isambiguous.
It depends on the extent to which capital costs are tax-
deductible.
Let us consider this point in more detail. The cost of
capital per dollar of investment is reduced by the
corporate taxrate times the present value ofdeprecia-
tion allowances (tz). The lower the corporate tax rate,
the lower the value of this deduction, and the higher-
the after-tax cost of capital. Thus, considering this
channel alone, lowering thecorporate tax rate actually
reduces the incentive to invest -
Another- primary component of capital cost is real
interest earnings foregone by investing in fixed capital.
In the absence of corporate taxation, this cost was
essentially the same whether- firms linanced their in-
vestment with internal funds or external borrowing.
This is no longet true when we introduce the corpo-
rate income tax. Nominal interest paid on debt is tax-
deductible, but foregone interest on internal funds is
not. This gives debt financing a tax advantage over
internal financing.’ The tax saving from inter-est de-
ductions is the corpor’ate taxrate It), multiplied by the
propoition of the investment financed with debt (LI,
multiplied by the nominal interest rate (ii. This
amount is subtracted fr-om the real interest rate in the
‘See Brealey and Myers (1984) for aclear summaryof this idea.
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capital cost in equation 4, which nowbecomes: In summary, reducing the corporate tax rate in-
creases the bencfits from new capital investment by
is) P )< MPK (1 —t( = P,I1 K cml Ii — ‘it + d — tLil. raising the left smde of equation 5. At the same time,
lower corporate tax rates rcduce the value of tax de-
As noted previously, the corporate mncome tax rate ductrons for depreciation and mnterest £xpense. This
also affects the revenue side of the investment dcci- increases the costs of new capital on the right side of
sion 1 he effective value of the marginal product is equation 5 Therefore, this theory cannot predict
II— tI P x MPK.A lower corporate tax rate stimulates whether the lower corporate tax rate will stimulate or
rnvestmcnt through this channel; with lower taxes, depress investment. To obtamn amore definite result,
firms keep a larger propor’tion of the revenues gener- we must look at the net effects of changes in the tax
ated by new mnvestment. law.
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Net Effects ofTax Changes on the Cost
ofCapital
To fully assess the impact of tax reform on the cost
ofcapital, we need away of combining all the changes
into a single measure. The basis for this is the theory
summarized in equation 5. By putting all the terms
affected by the tax system on the right side of the
equation, we obtain:
(6) (PIP,) X MPK = (I ktzl Ii — iv’ + d — tIll.
(I—tI
The right side ofthis equation is the tax-adjusted cost
of capital per dollar of investment spending. Some
representative calculations of this cost are shown in
table 2.’ The differences among the cost of capital
estimates for diffement asset classes are primarily due
to different rates of economic depreciation.
The first column of table 2 gives cost of capital
estimates based on assumptions that reflect the old
‘The basic reference for the tax-adjustedcost of capital measure is
Hall and Jorgenson (1967). Further details of the calculation are
given in the appendix. To makethe comparisons shown in table 2,
one must make assumptions about the future course of nominal
interest rates and expected inflation. The calculations in table 2
assume anominal interest rateof 10 percentand expected inflation
of4 percent. These assumptions arethe samefor the old and new
tax laws to focus on the results of tax changes alone. Some
economists have argued that the tax reform will change interest
ratesand inflation. This issue is considered laterin thearticle. Also,
thesecalculationsdo notconsiderthe effectsofchanges in personal
taxes on capital income. See Henderson (1986)for further discus-
sion of this issue.
tax law. The second column shows the effect of elimi-
nating the investment tax credit, while retaining all
other assumptions of the base case. This has a sig-
nificant impact on the after-tax cost of capital for
equipment. The average equipment cost of capital
rises by 2.4 percentage points with the repeal of the
investment tax credit. The credit does not apply to
structures.’
On the other hand, thethird column shows that the
effect of changing the depreciation rules is more pro-
nounced for the after-tax cost of business structures.
The present value of depreciation deductions de-
clines much more for structures than for’ equipment
under the new tax law. Compared with the base case
of theold taxlaw, the change in tax depreciation rules
raises the after-tax cost of capital by only 0.4 percent-
age points for equipment, on the average, while raising
the cost of capital by 2.2 percentage points for’ busi-
ness structures.
The fourth column shows the effect of lowering the
corporate tax rate from 46 percent to 34 percent. This
causes asubstantial reduction in the cost ofcapital for
business structures, but leaves the equipment figures
virtually unchanged. The analysis in the previous sec-
tion explains this result. Theoretically, the net effect of
‘In econometric analysis that uses National Income and Product
Accounts (NIPA) data, the investment tax credit for structures is
often not set at zero. This is because the NIPA data for structures
include asset classes, drilling rigs and air-conditioning equipment,
for example, whichwereeligible forthe credit. This is not important,
however, forthe illustrativecalculations in table 2.
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a lower corporate tax rate on the cost of capital is
ambiguous. The direction of change depends on the
value oftax deductions for depreciation. The depreci-
ation deductions for equipment per dollar of invest-
ment aremuch more valuable than those for business
structures, because equipment write-offs are faster.
Thus, lowering the corporate tax rate reduces the
value of equipment depreciation allowances more
than business structures allowances. On the other
hand, thebenefit of lower corporate taxes — from the
reduced proportion ofrevenues paid in taxes — is the
same for both equipment and structures. Thus, lower
corporate taxrates benefit structures much more than
equipment, as the fourth column of table 2 shows.
Theaspects ofthe tax reform bill that affect the cost
of capital have drawn significant criticism because
some analysts view them as anti-growth. The results
presented in table 2 provide some support for this
view. The last column shows the net effect ofthe new
tax law. All the cost ofcapital estimates rise relative to
the old law. For equipment, the repeal of the invest-
ment tax credit has the most important effect, and
some asset classes face higher costs due to changes in
the depreciation rules.
For-business structures, the change in depreciation
has a significant impact by itself, but this is offset to a
large degree by the benefits of a lower corporate tax
rate. The comparatively moderate increase in the cost
of capitalfor-business structures is somewhat surpris-
ing in light of the strong criticism the new tax treat-
ment of structures has drawn. This is probably be-
cause most analyses focus on the more obvious effect
of less generous structure depreciation. But it is im-
portant not to ignore the important impact of lower
corporate tax rates.”
THE IMPACT OF TAX REFORM
ON INVESTMENTAND THE
CAPITAL STOCK
How large an effect will changes in the cost of
capital have on U.S. investment and the capital stock?
This is not an easy question to answer. Economists
have not resolved important technical questions
about the sensitivity of the desired capital stock to
“Ofcourse, this point is relevantonly forprofitable firmsthat invest in
structures. Firms that invest only to obtain tax losses from fat
depreciation allowances will be hurt by the new depreciation rules,
but, since theypay no tax, will not be helped by lowertax rates.
changes in the after-tax cost ofcapital. Furthermore,
many economists have argued that tax reform will
lower the real interest rate. The calculations pre-
sented in table 2 assume that real interest rates do not
change under the new tax law.
The Link between Investment and the
Cost ofCapital
Economists generally agree that the newtaxlawwill
increase the cost ofcapital. The effect of this increase
on investment and the desired capital stock depends
on the economy’s production technology. The key
parameter is called the “elasticity of substitution”
between capital and other factors of production. This
measures the sensitivity of firms’ demand for capital to
changes in the cost of capital. An increase in the cost
of capital induces firms to substitute other factors of
production for capital. This lowers the desired capital
stock, and according to equation 1, investment falls.
The higherthe elasticity ofsubstitution, the biggerthe
reduction in the long-mn capital stock.
Let c, and c, represent the cost of capital under the
old and new tax laws, respectively. The theory pre-
dicts that the long-mn percentage change in the capi-
tal stockis given by:
(7( Percent Change in Capital = 100 x [(c,/cj’ — II,
where s is the elasticity of substitution. The assump-
tions used to derive equation 7 are discussed in the
appendix. The higher s is, the greater the long-run
reduction in the capital stock will be as a result of tax
reform.
The elasticity of substitution is determined by the
economy’s technology. Although not directly observ-
able, it can be estimated, and awide range ofestimates
of s can be found in the economics literature. Some
researchers have concluded that the elasticity of sub-
stitution is close to unity.’1 Ifthis istrue, the size ofthe
desired capital stock would be very sensitive to
changes in the cost of capital. Thus, even the modest
increase in the cost of capital shown in table 2 could
havea significantlong-run impact on the capital stock.
“If the elasticityofsubstitution is equal to one, theeconomy’stechnol-
ogy can be represented by a Cobb-Douglas production function.
Jorgenson (1971) finds empirical support for this case. Also see
Chirinko and Eisner (1982) forfurther discussion.
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With s equal to 1.0 in equation 7 and the cost of
capital figures from table 2 we obtain the following
results:
Percent Change
in Equipment = 100 )< [(17.I%/19.6%( — 11
= —12.8%
Percent Change
in Structures = 100 X [(13.2%/13.9%( — 11
= —5.0%.
These dramatic results support the views oftax reform
critics. A 12.8 percent drop in the stock of U.S. capital
equipment would cause a significant reduction in the
economy’s productive potential with a correspond-
ingly negative impact on future national output and
employment.”
Other researchers havefound that the desired capi-
tal stock is much less sensitive to changes in the cost
of capital. For example, in an extensive survey of pre-
dictions from large econometric models, Chirinko and
Eisner (1982) found estimates of s as low as 0.55 for
equipment and 0.16 for structures. Such low values
change the predicted effects of tax reform
significantly:
Percent Change
in Equipment = 100 X [(17.l%I19.6%(’~ — 11
= —7.2%
Percent Change
in Structures = 100 X j(13.Z%/13.9%I’~” — 1)
= -0.8%.
These results suggest that tax reform could have a
more moderate effect on equipment and vit-tually no
effect on structures.
Tax Reform, Interest Rates and
Investment
The analysis up to this point has assumed that the
interest r-ate would not be affected by tax reform. Yet,
there ar-c widespread predictions that tax reform will
“Some economists have argued that, although investment and the
capital stock will fall as a result of tax reform, the projects that are
undertaken will be more efficient. Eliminating specialtax breaks for
certain kinds of investment will encourage firms to carry out more
productive projects rather than projects that generate the biggest
taxsavings. Thus,the fall in investment may benefitthe economyby
reducing wasteful investment. A complete analysis of this issue is
outside the scope ofthis article. See Battenand Ott (1985), Hender-
son (1986), and the Economic Report ofthe President (1987), pp.
86—93, for furtherdiscussion.
decrease interest rates - The tax reform bill cuts mar-
ginal personal tax rates sharply, especially for’ high-
income individuals. Thus, the after-tax returns to sav-
ing rise, which stimulates saving and lower real
interest rates. Furthermore, reduced capital spending
lowers thedemand forfinancing. This also pushes real
interest rates lower. One recent study, for example,
predicts that the new tax law will cause a 1.3
percentage-point decline in the corporate bond yield
and a 0.5 percentage-point decline in the inflation
rate. Under these circumstances, the real interest rate
would decrease 0.8 percentage points.”
The effects of lower interest rates are explored in
table 3. The first column reproduces results given
earlier forthe percentage changes in the capital stock
assuming no changes in real interest rates due to the
newtax law. Figures are givenfor both thehigh elastic-
ity of substitution case (s = II and the low elasticity
case (s = 0.55 for equipment and s = 0.16 for struc-
tures). The columns show the effects of a range of
assumptions about the decline in the interest rate
induced by tax reform.
These figures show that even modest reductions in
real interest rates from the new tax law can substan-
tially mitigate the negative impact of tax reform on
investment. The effects on the stock of producers’
durable equipment are moderate, especially with the
lower- elasticity of substitution estimate. Surprisingly,
the calculations show that the desired stock of busi-
ness structures may even rise with real interest rate
reductions in the middle of the relevant r’ange. Thus,
the dramatic reductions in the capital stock and in-
vestment predicted by some critics of the new taxlaw
represent a worst case, where the elasticity of substi-
tution is high and the real rate ofinterest does not fall
in r-esponse to taxchanges.
The Effects ofIncreasing Corporate
Tax Burdens
The analysis to this point has used conventional
capital theor’etic concepts to evaluate the impact of tax
reform on investment incentives. Tax policy affects
investment decisions by changing the costs and
benefits of individual investment projects. A firm can
obtain financing for any profitable project at the pre-
vailing cost of capital. Thus, the reduction of a firm’s
inter-nal funds available to finance investment caused
“These estimates arefrom Prakken(1986), p.30. Someeconomists
have argued thatthe fall in long-term interest rates during1986 was
due, at least in part, to expectations that the new tax law would
reduce interestrates.
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by the new taxlaw does not directly affect investment.
Firms offset the decline in internal cash flow by bor-
rowing the necessary funds in external capital mar-
kets.’4 The economics literature, however, has iden-
tified reasons why this view may not be valid.
The assumption that all desired investment can be
financed at the market interest rate ignores the prob-
lem of communicating information from borrower to
lender. Jt is costly for lenders to evaluate the prospec-
tive returns of various investment projects because
they do not have extensive knowledge ofthe particular
situations facing potential borrowers. While borrow-
ers will provide some relevant infonnation, they have
an incentive to present an optimistic view of their
circumstances. Thus, lenders may be willing to
finance some investment projects only at interest
rates so high that these projects become unprofitable.
Furthermore, as various studies have shown, when
capital market information is costly, some firms may
not be able to obtain external financing even at high
interest rates.” In this case, the new tax law could
“An immediateobjection thatmight be raised againstthis view is that
firms must pay interest on external funds, so borrowing appears
more costlythan internal finance. This is true on the firm’s income
statement. But in economic terms, the firm also givesup the oppor-
tunity to earn interest on internal funds when they are spent on
capital accumulation.
“This situation is called ‘credit rationing” in the economicsliterature.
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) presenta theoretical modelthat explains
this possibility. This idea is linked to investment theoretically by
Greenwald, Stiglitz, and Weiss (1984) and empirically by Fazzari
and Athey (1987).
reduce investment because firms would not be able to
offset the loss ofinternal funds by borrowing.
Furthermore, even iflenders are willing to provide
funds at favorable market interest rates, firms them-
selves may be reluctant to use credit markets to re-
cover investment finance lost under the new tax law.
Firms are concerned about their debt-equity ratios
and their credit ratings. Thus, they may choose to
curtail capital expenditures rather than increase bor-
rowing. New equity issues are a potential source of
funds, but the historical evidence shows that little new
investment is financed through new share issue.”
How big an impact will tax reform have on invest-
ment through this channel? The investment equation
I can be modified to address this question:
Change in Cash
IS) Investment = Depreciation + Desired +b x
- How
Caprral
The parameter b represents the size of the effect of
internal cashflow on investment. Estimation ofb from
“Inadetailed studyof 12 largecompanies over 10 years, Donaldson
and Lorsch (1983), p. 52, show that only 0.5 percent ofnew funds
raised resulted from equity issues. They also find a strong prefer-
ence for internal investment financing, rather than debt financing.
Common and preferred stock issues accounted foronly 3.9 percent
ofthe sources offundsfor 799industrial firmsreported on the Value
Line database in 1984. Greenwald, Stiglitz and Weiss (1984) pro-
vide a theoretical explanation, basedon capital marketsignaling, for
why firmsavoid equity finance.
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historical data shows that cash flow has been posi-
tively related to equipment investment over the last
three decades; cash flow had no significant effect,
however, on business structures investment. The de-
tails of the estimation are presented in the appendix.
These estimates provide one way to predict the
effect of increasing corporate taxes while reducing
personal taxes. Suppose, in the absence of tax
changes, that real equipment investment would grow
from mid-1986 through 1988at aS percent annual rate.
Nowsuppose that the newtax act will increase corpo-
rate taxes by $25.2 billion in 1987 and $23.9 billion in
1988.” Then, the estimates of equation 8 predict a 2.8
percentage-point reduction in equipment investment
for 1987 and a 2.1 percentage-point reduction in 1988,
relative to thebenchmarks percent real growth trend,
While not especially tar-ge relative to historical varia-
tions in equipment investment, these changes are still
substantial.”
There is an important qualification to these predic-
tions. The calculations are based on the assumption
that firms absorb the whole tax increase in reduced
cash flow rather than increasing before-tax markups
to recover part of the tax increase through higher
prices. This assumption becomes less realistic as the
forecast horizon expands further into the future and
firms revise their-pricing policies to reflectthe new tax
system. This eventually could reduce or even elimi-
nate the effect of higher taxes on corporate cash flow.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
How big an impact wilt ta’r-eform have on invest-
ment? The analysis presented here shows a r’ather
wide range ofpossibilities. Capital theory implies that
the new tax law will increase the cost of capital,
especially for producers’ durable equipment invest-
ment, tending to reduce investment and lower the U.S.
capital stock. The size ofthis effect, however, is uncer-
tain. Under some assumptions, the rising cost of capi-
tal leads to a dr-amatic 13 percent tong-run fall in the
“The5 percent annual growth rate wasthe actual growth rateof real
producers’ durable equipment investment from the second quarter
of 1985 throughthe secondquarterof 1986. It givesabenchmarkfor
equipment investment growth in the absence of tax reform. The
estimated changes in corporatetaxeswere obtained from the con-
gressional conference committee report on the Tax Reform Act of
1986. See Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. (1986).
“The standard deviation of the producers’ real durable equipment
growth rate from 1970 through 1985 was9.9 percentage points.
stock of equipment. Different assumptions, however,
lead to much smaller changes. Moreover, lower inter-
est rates caused by tax changes will likely offset some
of the rise in after-tax capital costs due to changes in
tax rules.
The 1987 Economic Report ofthe President predicts
that ‘a somewhat higher overall marginal tax rate on
capital income will modestly reduce the economy’s
long-run capital intensity” (p. 791. The analysis pre-
sented in this article supports this view. A middle-of-
the-road forecast indicates that the new tax law alone
will cause a moderate decline in equipment invest-
ment, chiefly due to the repeal of the investment tax
credit. The effects on business structure investment
will likely be small, at least for structure investment
motivated by economic profits as opposed to tax
benefits (see footnote 10). The rollback of generous
depreciation treatment for structures increases their
after-tax cost, but the lower corporate tax rate and the
potential for lower real interest rates largely offset the
depreciation rule change.
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Technical Appendix
A. Present Value ofDepreciation
Allowances
The tax service life for cars and light trucks under
the oldtax lawwas three years-It has beenlengthened
to five years under the tax reform act. The tax service
lives for office, computing and accounting equipment,
and communications equipment were fiveyears un-
der the old law.Tax reform did not change the depre-
ciation period for office, computing and accounting
equipment, but it extended the service life for com-
munications equipment to seven years. The tax ser-
vice lives are based on the Asset Depreciation Range
system. See Ott (1984)for further details.
Depreciation allowances for equipment were com-
puted using a 150 percent declining balance method
under the old tax law and a 200 percent declining
balance under the new law. A switch to straight-line
depreciation to maximize the deduction is also as-
sumed. These methods are discussed in detail in Ott
(1984). The half-year convention was used that treats
all purchases within a year as if they occur at mid-
year.
To compute the present value, depreciation deduc-
tions were discounted at an after-tax rate obtained by
multiplying the nominal interest rate by one minus
the appropriate marginal corporate tax rate.
B. Cost of Capital
The cost ofcapital calculations in the text are based
on the Hall and Jorgenson (19671 formula. The cost of
capital, often called the implicit capital rental rate, is
given by the formula:
1—k — tz(1 —0.5 )< k( -
c = 100 x [(1— tL(r — Ti’ + d],
Prakken, Joel. “The MacroeconomicsofTax Reform,” presentedat
the American Council for Capital Formation conference entitled
“The Consumption Tax:ABetter Alternative?” (September 1986).
Stiglitz, Joseph, and Andrew Weiss. “Credit Rationing in Markets
with Imperfect Information,” American Economic Review (June
1981), pp. 393—410.
where
k = investment tax credit rate,
= corporate taxrate,
z = presentvalue ofa one dollar depreciation allowance,
L = leverage ratio (debt as aproportion ofassets),
= nominal interest rate,
d = economic depreciation rate,and
= expected inflationrate.
A leverage ratio of 0.306, based on data from the
Washington University Macro Model (WUMM(, was
used in all the calculations.
The capital stock calculations given in the text are
based on a constant elasticity of substitution aggre-
gate production function. With this technolo~t, the
desired capital stock is proportional to c~where c is
the cost of capital defined above and si sthe elasticity
of substitution. These calculations assume that the
level ofoutput and the ratio of theprice ofinvestment
goods to the price of output are constant.
C. Estimated Effect of Cash Flow
Changes on Investment
The estimated reductions in equipment investment
due to lower corporate cash flow caused by tax reform
are based on the regression equation:




+ 02081 IFIN, + 0.0953 tFIN,, + 0.0136 tFIN_,
(0.0380) (0.0538) (0.0534)
INVE, =pi-oducers’ durableequipment investment at time
tin 1982 dollars,
K,_, lagged stock of equipment (as calculated for
WUMM),
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P =implicit price deflatorforprivate non-farm output,
= implicit price deflator for producers’ durable
equipment,
=real private, non-farm output, and
IFIN,: internal finance, defined as after-tax corporate
profits plus depreciation allowances minus corpo-
rate dividends, deflated by E,.
Standard errors of the estimated coefficients appear
beneath the estimates. The f(•) function represents a
14-quarter, third-degree polynomial distributed lag.
Theequation was estimated with a correction for first
order autocorrelation of the residuals, with quarterly
data from the third quarter of1956 through thesecond
quarter of 1986.
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